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Destruction of European Freedom of
Expression
Michaela Cloutier*
ABSTRACT
In 2019, the European Parliament and Council passed Directive 2019/790. The Directive’s passage marked the end of a fouryear-long legislative attempt to impose more liability for copyright violations on Online Service Providers, an effort which was
controversial from the start. Online Service Providers fear that
the 2019 Directive, especially its Article 17, will completely
change the structure of liability on the Internet, forcing providers
to adopt expensive content filtering systems. Free speech advocates fear that ineffective filtering technology will infringe upon
Internet users’ rights to express themselves, and legal scholars
have pointed out the Directive’s inconsistency with prior Euro* J.D. Candidate, Pennsylvania State University Dickinson Law, 2021. I would
like to thank my family for their support and encouragement throughout the writing process, in particular the feedback from my brother that the final product is
“definitely long.” I would also like to thank Matthew for his unending patience of
my inferior Bluebook competence. Finally, I am grateful to Professor Martin
Skladany for his help developing my topic and commiseration about the state of
copyright law globally.
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pean legislation and case law. The final version of the Directive
does not contain an explicit proactive monitoring requirement
for Online Service Providers, but criticism of the Directive persists. In May of 2019, Poland brought an official action in the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) against the EU
Parliament and Council, alleging that the Directive conflicts with
rights protected under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, specifically freedom of expression.
This Comment first discusses the text of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the balance that courts had previously
struck between conflicting fundamental rights implicated by
three earlier EU Directives. Next, this Comment examines
CJEU case law on intermediary liability for copyright violations,
especially as those decisions relate to the intersection of intellectual property rights and freedom of expression. Finally, this Comment analyzes Poland’s challenge in light of the prior statutory
framework and the CJEU’s fundamental rights jurisprudence to
identify some of the salient issues in the pending case on the Directive’s legality.
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INTRODUCTION

On April 17, 2019, the European Union (EU) Parliament and
Council passed Council Directive 2019/790 on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market.1 Throughout the four
years of drafting, hearings, and negotiations that culminated in the
Directive’s passage,2 two clauses created points of contention: Article 11 (15 as passed) and Article 13 (17 as passed).3 Article 11 is
sometimes referred to as the Link Tax because it requires that any
websites containing more than a “snippet” of copyrighted information from elsewhere obtain a license from the initial author.4 Article 13 places copyright liability onto Online Service Providers
(OSPs)5 and online platforms for all infringing material uploaded
1. Council Directive 2019/790, 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92, 92; see also Cory
Doctorow, The European Copyright Directive: What Is It, and Why Has It Drawn
More Controversy than Any Other Directive in EU History?, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 19, 2019), https://bit.ly/2Pz5oKY [https://perma.cc/VTE59JW7] [hereinafter Doctorow, The European Copyright Directive] (explaining that
directives are rules made by the European Parliament which become binding law
upon European citizens only after they are “transposed” via national legislation in
each EU member state).
2. Dave Davis, What You Need to Know About the European Copyright Directive, COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE CTR., (May 15, 2019), https://bit.ly/2TbythW
[https://perma.cc/WX3Q-2DPD].
3. Doctorow, The European Copyright Directive, supra note 1 (identifying
Article 11, the “link tax,” and Article 13 “censorship machines” as the most controversial aspects of the Directive).
4. Id. (explaining that Article 11 is especially controversial because it provides
no definition of “snippet,” meaning that EU member states can pass legislation
defining the term in varying ways to apply to any amount of content the member
states see fit).
5. See Best Practices for Online Service Providers: Are You an OSP?, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (June 20, 2008), https://bit.ly/2TbOuVe [https://
perma.cc/USC6-JP66] (explaining that an Online Service Provider is any entity offering the transmission or routing of online communications, or connections to aid
those communications, as well as any provider of online services or network access
including email services and website hosting). Essentially every website could be
considered an OSP. Id. For the purposes of this Comment, “OSP” is meant to
encapsulate both Internet Service Providers and online content providers as used
in US and EU legislation. See Jay Darrington, What is an Internet Content Provider?, CHRON, https://bit.ly/38JFTiN [https://perma.cc/5AES-YLDZ] (last visited
Aug. 9, 2020) (explaining that Internet Service Provider “refers to the company
who gives you Internet access, such as AT&T or Comcast” while an online content
provider or Internet content provider is “a website or organization that handles
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via or onto their services.6 Earlier versions of Article 13 explicitly
required OSPs to impose content filters in order to comply with this
imposition of liability.7 The European Union Parliament and
Council discussed both controversial articles extensively and then,
based on expert advice, decided against including the proposed versions of the articles.8 German MEP9 Axel Voss later reintroduced
the controversial articles—versions that had already been discarded—and they inexplicably made their way into the final version
of the Directive.10 While the final versions of the articles do not
contain explicit filtering obligations, the articles’ opponents remain
concerned that the effect is the same.11
Proponents of the 2019 Copyright Directive had difficulty getting the Directive passed with these two clauses present, even in
forms that did not contain explicit monitoring obligations.12 Prior
to voting on the actual Directive, there was a last-minute vote on

the distribution of online content such as blogs, videos, music[,] or files.”). Some
examples include ABC News, Disney, and MSNBC. Id.
6. Doctorow, The European Copyright Directive, supra note 1 (“Article 13
removes the protection for online services . . . . Instead, it says that online platforms have a duty to ensure that none of their users infringe copyright, period.”);
see Council Directive 2019/790, arts. 17(1), 17(3), 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92, 119 (imposing liability for “giv[ing] the public access to copyright-protected works or other
protected subject matter uploaded by its users” and revoking limitations on liability provided by prior Directives).
7. See, e.g., Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, at 29–30, COM (2016) 593 final
(Sept. 14, 2016) (“Information society service providers that store and provide to
the public access to large amounts of works or other subject-matter uploaded by
their users shall . . . take measures to ensure the functioning of agreements concluded with rightholders for the use of their works . . . such as the use of effective
content recognition technologies . . . .”).
8. Doctorow, The European Copyright Directive, supra note 1.
9. See Members of the European Parliament, EUROPA, https://bit.ly/2zQeyy2
[https://perma.cc/K2MZ-Y5HB] (last visited Aug. 9, 2020) (explaining that MEP
stands for “member of European Parliament”). The European Union is made up
of 705 Members elected by the 27 member states of the European Union. Id.
10. Doctorow, The European Copyright Directive, supra note 1 (explaining
that the clauses “were reintroduced in forms that had already been discarded as
unworkable” and that the reintroduction led to criticism “from the world’s top
technical, copyright, journalistic, and human rights experts and organizations”).
11. Id. “Article 13 advocates say that filters aren’t required, but when challenged, not one has been able to explain how to comply with Article 13 without
using filters.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
12. See generally id. (identifying the reintroduction of Articles 11 and 13 as a
turning point before which the Directive appeared close to passing).
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whether to reconsider amending Articles 11 and 13.13 The vote to
reconsider failed by just five votes.14
Following that vote, as many as ten MEPs admitted to voting
mistakenly,15 believing that they were voting against the controversial articles, rather than against amending them.16 However, despite the confusion, Parliament proceeded to a vote on the
Directive itself.17 The final vote was 348 to 274 with 36 abstentions.18 While Article 11 and Article 13 were both subjects of criticism, only Article 13 is the subject of this Comment.
Public outcry against Article 13 was immense.19 There were
protests across Europe.20 In Germany alone there were 40 separate
protests, with 40,000 protestors in Munich and 30,000 in Berlin.21
Some politicians claimed that the public outcry against Article 13
was being manufactured by big tech companies and that petition
signatures were fake.22 Hundreds of thousands of protestors responded by showing up with signs reading “we are not bots” to
demonstrate that real people were concerned about Article 13’s imminent impact.23 Some European websites went dark24 or dis13. See Copyright in the Digital Single Market: European Parliament Vote,
EUR. PARL. DOC. (2019).
14. Id.; Emanuel Karlsten, Sweden Democrats & Swedish Social Democrats
Defeat Motion to Amend Articles 11 & 13, MEDIUM, (Mar. 26, 2019), https://bit.ly/
39eRequ [https://perma.cc/MV8J-ZKJZ].
15. Mike Masnick, Enough MEPs Say They Mistakenly Voted for Articles 11
& 13 that the Vote Should Have Flipped; EU Parliament Says Too Bad, TECHDIRT
(Mar. 26, 2019), https://bit.ly/2PBtpRY [https://perma.cc/86MH-XUND]; James
Vincent, Ten European Lawmakers Say They Voted Against Pivotal Copyright
Amendment by Accident, THE VERGE, (Mar. 27, 2019, 11:37 AM), https://bit.ly/
2Tan161.
16. Karlsten, supra note 14 (“If [the MEPs] had approved the vote, there’d
have been a chance to delete [the] controversial Articles 11 and 13 from the
Directive.”).
17. Id.
18. European Parliament Press Release, European Parliament Approves New
Rules for the Internet (Mar. 26, 2019).
19. See EU Copyright Bill: Protests Across Europe Highlight Rifts over Reform Plans, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Mar. 23, 2019), https://bit.ly/3ahNgNE [https://
perma.cc/BR4L-4T6J].
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Mike Masnick, Huge Protests Across Europe Protest Article 13; Politician
Lies and Claims They Were Paid to Be There, TECHDIRT (Mar. 25, 2019, 12:28
AM), https://bit.ly/2PzCKJZ [https://perma.cc/T5QH-XXPE].
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Why German Wikipedia Is Down for 24 Hours, THE LOCAL
(Mar. 21, 2019, 09:28 CET+01:00), https://bit.ly/2YEz9z2 [https://perma.cc/2MLTMXBK] (“In place of the usual Wikipedia site, for Thursday visitors will see a
black screen with white writing describing the reasons for the protest.”).
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played banners in protest,25 and over 130 European businesses
asked Parliament to reject the Directive.26 People were concerned
about over-filtering of fair-use content like memes and mashups
due to the lack of sophisticated filtering technology.27 Others were
concerned about the untenable costs to small businesses of expensive filtering software like Content ID28 and the effect the Directive
would have on freedom of expression and the exchange of ideas via
the Internet.29
The Directive became one of the most controversial issues in
EU history.30 The petition opposing the Directive attracted more

25. Tamara Evdokimova, Online Protests Sweep European Internet Ahead of
Copyright Law Vote, SLATE (Mar. 21, 2019, 4:20 PM), https://bit.ly/32FyWfC
[https://perma.cc/CH7J-T6L3].
26. Cory Doctorow, More than 130 European Businesses Tell the European
Parliament: Reject the #CopyrightDirective, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar.
20, 2019), https://bit.ly/3adz4W7 [https://perma.cc/SAM8-57N9].
27. See Ryan Browne, What Europe’s Copyright Overhaul Means for YouTube, Facebook and the Way You Use the Internet, CNBC (Mar. 29, 2019, 2:01
AM), https://cnb.cx/2uGAMA6 [https://perma.cc/7L4H-CU3H] (“Detractors have
said this would lead to controversial pre-filter systems, where everything from
memes to GIFs are blocked from online platforms.”). See also Doctorow, The
European Copyright Directive, supra note 1 (“[F]ilters are notoriously inaccurate,
prone to overblocking legitimate material—and lacking in checks and balances,
making it easy for censors to remove material they disagree with.”).
28. See Doctorow, The European Copyright Directive, supra note 1 (“All but
the crudest filters cost so much that only the biggest tech companies can afford to
build them. . . .”). The most famous copyright filter is YouTube’s “ContentID,
which blocks videos that match items identified by a small, trusted group of rightsholders.” Id. See also How Content ID Works, YOUTUBE, https://bit.ly/2As4N9c
[https://perma.cc/FXK3-MBA6] (last visited Aug. 9, 2020) (“Copyright owners can
use a system called Content ID to easily identify and manage their content on
YouTube. Videos uploaded to YouTube are scanned against a database of files
that have been submitted to us by content owners. Copyright owners get to decide
what happens when content in a video on YouTube matches a work they own.”).
YouTube users have complained that the Content ID system is already open to
abuse and that more stringent regulations would only exacerbate the issues.
Browne, supra note 27.
29. See Doctorow, The European Copyright Directive, supra note 1 (explaining that Article 13’s opponents are concerned about filters not being able to recognize “fair dealing” exceptions and incidental uses). Fair dealing refers to a myriad
of European exceptions/defenses to copyright violation—similar to American fair
use—and includes parody, criticism, and commentary. See id. Incidental use occurs when copyrighted content is playing or pictured in the background of a post
or new work but is done so accidentally or not for the purpose of showcasing the
copyrighted content. See id. For example, “[i]f your kid takes her first steps in
your living room while music is playing in the background, the “incidental” sound
could trigger a filter,” and the video might be taken down, even though the use
would likely be permissible under fair dealing. Id.
30. Doctorow, The European Copyright Directive, supra note 1.
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signatures than any other petition in Change.org’s history.31 In
April 2019, the Directive passed, with a version of the controversial
Article 17 (previously 13) remaining, but without an explicit obligation to monitor, and with a disclaimer that the Article should not be
read to require active monitoring.32
Following the Directive’s passage, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Poland, Italy, and Finland issued a joint statement about
their concerns, claiming that the Directive fails to meet its purported aims of stimulating innovation, creativity, investment, and
the production of new content.33 The countries articulated their belief that the Directive represents a step backward in innovation for
the EU and expressed concerns about the legal clarity of the
Directive.34
On May 24, 2019, Poland filed a challenge to the Directive in
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), claiming that
the Directive sets up a scheme of liability that essentially requires
OSPs to proactively monitor all content posted to their sites, even
though it purports not to impose a monitoring requirement.35 Poland further claims that this obligation to monitor violates the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.36
Part II of this Comment will discuss the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and its effect on the 2019 Directive.37 It will also
explore the framework of copyright law in the EU prior to the passage of the 2019 Directive, including relevant EU Directives and
CJEU case law.38 Part III of this Comment will discuss Poland’s
challenge to the Directive’s legitimacy in the CJEU, including the
31. Id.; see Stop the Censorship-Machinery! Save the Internet!, CHANGE.ORG,
https://bit.ly/39beRQJ [https://perma.cc/PLA9-B6JL] (last visited Aug. 9, 2020).
32. See Council Directive 2019/790, art. 17(8), 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92, 120.
33. General Secretariat of the Council, Joint Statement by the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, Poland, Italy and Finland, Draft Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single
Market and Amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC (First Reading), 2016/
0280 (COD), (Apr. 15, 2019), 2.
34. Id. at 2 (“Furthermore, we feel that the Directive lacks legal clarity, will
lead to legal uncertainty for many stakeholders concerned and may encroach upon
EU citizens’ rights.”).
35. Action Brought on May 24, 2019, Case C-401/19, Pol. v. Parliament, 2019
O.J. (C 270) 21–22. Poland argues that the Directive’s “obligation to make best
efforts to ensure the unavailability of specific works” and “to prevent the future
uploads of protected works . . . [requires] the service providers—in order to avoid
liability—to carry out prior automatic verification (filtering) of content uploaded
online by users, and . . . introduce preventive control mechanisms.” Id.
36. Id.
37. See infra Part II.
38. See infra Part II.
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three tests that the CJEU will consider when making its decision.39
This Comment recommends that the CJEU overturn the 2019 Directive on the basis of Poland’s arguments but concludes that the
decision of the CJEU is unpredictable and will depend on whether
the CJEU finds that the Directive actually imposes a general monitoring obligation.40 Regardless of the CJEU’s decision, the 2019
Copyright Directive and the resulting controversy and litigation
have brought to light the inconsistency of copyright regulation in
the EU. Ideally the CJEU’s ruling will succeed where the Directive
failed and clarify the official EU policy on intermediary liability
without mandating an overhaul of the existing copyright and freedom of expression framework.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. Overview of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights
Major concern with the 2019 Copyright Directive has centered
around its apparent conflict with the European Union Charter on
Fundamental Rights41 (“the Charter”) on the basis that the Directive insufficiently protects the Charter-enumerated right to freedom
of expression.42 The Charter contains protections for both intellectual property rights and freedom of expression.43 These protections
require European member countries and the EU itself to ensure
balance between any Charter-protected rights that might be implicated in all legislation they enact.44
Specifically, Article 17 of the Charter provides for protection
of property rights, which includes intellectual property.45 Article 17
allows for the regulation of the use of property only “in so far as is
necessary for the general interest” and otherwise gives everyone
the right to “own, use, dispose of and bequeath” his or her own
possessions.46
Article 11 governs the protection of freedom of expression and
information.47 This protection includes the right to “receive and
impart information and ideas without interference by public author39. See infra Part III.
40. See infra Part IV.
41. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 18, 2000,
2000 O.J. (C 364) 1 [hereinafter Charter].
42. Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon et al., An Academic Perspective on the Copyright
Reform, 33 COMPUT. L. & SEC. REV. 13, 14 (2017).
43. Charter, supra note 41, arts. 17(2), 11.
44. See id. art. 52.
45. Id. art. 17.
46. Id. art. 17(1).
47. Id. art. 11.
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ity.”48 Article 11 also protects the “freedom and pluralism of the
media.”49 The CJEU uses “freedom to receive and impart information” and “freedom of expression” somewhat interchangeably
throughout its case law but both terms refer to the Article 11 protection that the 2019 Copyright Directive allegedly infringes.50
Article 52 of the Charter sets forth the scope of the guaranteed
rights.51 Article 52 requires that any limitations on the Charter’s
rights and freedoms “respect the essence of those rights and freedoms.”52 Article 52 further requires that specific laws must provide
for any such limitations; limitations on Charter-protected rights
cannot be inferred or assumed.53 Article 52 specifies that limitations are “[s]ubject to the principle of proportionality.”54 Such limitations must be “necessary and genuinely meet objectives of
general interest [recognized] by the Union or the need to protect
the rights . . . of others.”55 The member states of the European
Union introduced the Charter in December 2000,56 and the Treaty
of Lisbon57 made the Charter legally binding as of 2009.58 This
means that all European member state and European Council legislation is subject to the Charter’s provisions and must take care not
to infringe upon these rights beyond the extent permissible under
48. Id. art. 11(1).
49. Id. art. 11(2).
50. See id. art. 11; see e.g. Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société belge
des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL, 2011 E.C.R. I-12006, 12027 para. 50
(referring to the Article 11 protection as “freedom to receive or impart
information”).
51. Charter, supra note 41, art. 52.
52. Id. art. 52(1).
53. See id.
54. Id. See generally Proportionality Principle, EUR-LEX, https://bit.ly/
2wZ3Aok [https://perma.cc/D526-RPU9] (last visited Aug. 9, 2020) for more information about the principle of proportionality.
55. Charter, supra note 41, art. 52(1).
56. Id. See European Parliament Press Release, Proclamation of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights by the Three European Institutions (Dec. 12, 2007) for an
explanation of the Charter’s proclamation, a formal event which “provides a legal
basis for the article which refers to the Charter in the EU Reform Treaty,” the
Treaty of Lisbon. The proclamation was conducted by the heads of the three European institutions, the Parliament, Commission, and Council, and it took place
the day before the official signing of the Treaty of Lisbon. Id.
57. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on the European Union and the
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1
[hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon].
58. Id. at 134 (explaining, at Article 6(2) under Final Provisions of the Treaty,
that the “[t]reaty shall enter into force on 1 January 2009,” subject to the ratification process).
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the principle of proportionality and the essence of the rights and
necessity requirements.59
B. Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights
The drafters of the Charter also issued Explanations Relating
to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (“the Explanations”).60 The
Explanation on Article 17 provides that the guarantees of Article
17, Paragraph 1 of the Charter “shall apply as appropriate to intellectual property,” which includes literary and artistic property as
well as patents, trademarks, and associated rights.61 This means
that the Charter affords less sweeping protections to intellectual
property rights than to other forms of property under Article 17
and other rights under their respective Articles in the Charter.62
In contrast, the Explanation on Article 11, Freedom of Expression and Information, contains no such appropriateness limitations.63 With one exception—licensing requirements for
“broadcasting, television, or cinema enterprises”64—the Explanations do not indicate any limitations on the extent to which the protections of the Charter apply to freedom of expression rights.65
The Explanations also provide commentary on Article 52 of
the Charter.66 The language in the Charter limiting its scope
originated in CJEU case law on fundamental rights, allowing for
59. See Charter, supra note 41, art. 52.
60. Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2007 O.J. (C
303) 17 [hereinafter Explanations]. The Explanations were issued under the authority of the Convention that drafted the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Id.
They do not have the force of law but are intended as a tool of interpretation and
clarification. Id.
61. Id. at 24.
62. See id. at 24.
63. Id. at 21.
64. See European Convention on Human Rights art. 10(1), Nov. 4, 1950,
E.T.S. No. 5. The Explanations clarify that Article 11 of the Charter corresponds
to Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which also deals with
the right to freedom of expression and information. Explanations, supra note 60,
at 21 (referencing European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S.
No. 5). The Explanations further clarify that this correspondence leaves intact
“any restrictions which Union law may impose on Member States’ right to introduce the licensing arrangements referred to in the third sentence of Article 10(1)
of the ECHR.” Explanations, supra note 60, at 33. The referenced sentence from
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) allows member states to require
the licensing of broadcasting, television, or cinema enterprises. European Convention on Human Rights art. 10(1), Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5. Thus, the Explanations indicate that the requirement of such licensing does not constitute a
limitation of freedom of expression in violation of Article 11 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights. See Explanations, supra note 60, at 33.
65. Explanations, supra note 60, at 21.
66. Id. at 32.
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restrictions on fundamental rights only when such restrictions “correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the Community” and do not rise to the level of “disproportionate and
unreasonable interference undermining the very substance of those
[rights].”67 The Explanations clarify that the meaning and scope of
Charter-guaranteed rights are also subject to determination in the
case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the
CJEU.68 Thus, the protections for both Intellectual Property and
Freedom of Expression and the application of those protections to
European Union legislation should be read in light of the case law
of those courts, and any limitations on fundamental rights must be
proportionate.69
C. EU Directives on Intellectual Property and the Internet
Since 2000, the EU has passed several directives that relate to
liability for copyright-infringing content posted online.70 Prior to
2019, these directives created a liability scheme that was less strict
than the scheme the 2019 Directive imposes, especially for OSPs.71
1. The 2000 eCommerce Directive
The 2000 eCommerce Directive,72 particularly Articles 12
through 15,73 describes the pre-2019 intellectual property liability
scheme for OSPs.74 Articles 10 through 21 of the eCommerce Directive set forth the liability limitations for OSPs.75 Article 12 exempts an OSP from liability when the OSP limits its involvement to
the transmission of infringing data, so long as the providers do not
initiate the transmission, select the receiver, or select/modify the information in the transmission.76 When OSPs limit involvement in
67. Id. at 32–33, quoting Case C-292/97, Karlsson, 2000 E.C.R. I-2760, 2777,
para. 45.
68. Explanations, supra note 60, at 33.
69. Id. at 33.
70. See Santiago Nadal, Intellectual Property and Freedom of Speech: A Longstanding European Discussion, 61 No. 8 DRI For Def. 25, 31. (2019).
71. Id. at 28.
72. Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1.
73. Id. arts. 12, 15.
74. Péter Mezei & István Harkai, Enforcement of Copyrights over the Internet:
A Review of the Recent ECJ Case Law, 21 J. INTERNET L. 12, 16 (2017).
75. Council Directive 2000/31, arts. 10–21, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 12–15; see
Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. L.
REV. 335, 393 (2005).
76. Council Directive 2000/31, art. 12, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 12; Giuseppe Colangelo & Mariataresa Maggiolino, ISPs’ Copyright Liability in the EU Digital Single Market Strategy, 26 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 142, 143 (2018).
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this manner, they are “mere conduits” and are not responsible
under Article 12.77
Article 13 of the eCommerce Directive renders an OSP exempt from liability when it provides only “caching.”78 Caching occurs when an OSP supplies only “automatic, intermediate, and
temporary storage,” and the OSP cannot modify the information.79
To preserve the exemption, OSPs also must comply with the requirements governing access to their stored information and expeditiously remove or disable access to the information upon learning
that a court or administrative agency has ordered removal.80
Article 14 similarly provides a general exemption from liability
for mere hosting,81 subject to two conditions.82 A hosting OSP is
exempt if the OSP has no actual knowledge of illegal activity and is
unaware of any facts indicating illegal activity is occurring.83 Additionally, an OSP is exempt if it acts expeditiously, upon obtaining
knowledge of such illegal activity, to remove or disable access to the
infringing content.84 However, Article 14(3) does not prevent a
court from requiring that the OSP prevent or terminate infringement.85 Article 14 also does not prevent member states from establishing procedures to govern removal or disablement of access to
information.86
Finally, Article 15 of the eCommerce Directive established that
OSPs have neither a general obligation to monitor the information
OSPs transmit or store, nor to actively seek out unlawful activity for
prevention.87 Commentators frequently refer to Article 15’s protection from a general monitoring requirement as the “safe harbor”
77. Colangelo, supra note 76, at 142.
78. Id. at 142 (citing Council Directive 2000/31, art. 13, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1,
13).
79. Council Directive 2000/31, art. 13, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 13.
80. Id.
81. Id. art. 14. Hosting occurs when a provider offers a service “that consists
of the storing of information provided by a recipient of the service.” Id. art. 14(1).
82. Id. art. 14.
83. Id.
84. Id. Article 14 of the eCommerce Directive is an essential prong of the
pre-2019 regime for copyright protection in the EU. See Colangelo, supra note 76,
at 142. Coupled with the absence of a duty to obtain knowledge—for example,
through proactive monitoring—Article 14 protects hosting OSPs from liability for
copyright infringement in a wide range of situations. See id. Under this scheme,
OSPs are only liable if a rightholder or third party informs the OSP of infringement and the OSP does nothing to disable access to the infringing material. Id.
See also infra note 246 (elaborating on this system, sometimes referred to as notice-and-takedown).
85. Council Directive 2000/31, art. 14(3), 2000 O.J. (L 178).
86. Id. art. 14.
87. Id. art. 15.
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provision because it gives relief from liability to OSPs that meet the
specified conditions.88
Article 15 does provide, however, that member states may establish obligations for OSPs to inform competent public authorities
of alleged unlawful activities or information occurring via their services.89 Under Article 15, member states may also require OSPs to
communicate information to the relevant authorities to permit
them to identify the infringing users.90 Article 14(3) indicates that
member states may establish some procedures for removal or disablement, but Article 15 insists that such measures may not rise to
the level of a general monitoring obligation.91
2. The 2001 InfoSoc Directive
A year after passing the eCommerce Directive, the European
Union enacted a Directive on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society
(“InfoSoc Directive”).92 Recital 59 of the InfoSoc Directive93 asserts that intermediaries are often in the best position to end infringing activities.94 The Directive thus provides that rightholders95
should be able to apply for injunctions directly against intermediaries who “carry”96 a third party’s infringement of a protected work.97 Article 8(3) of the Directive reiterates this
88. See Colangelo, supra note 76, at 143.
89. Council Directive 2000/31, art. 15(2), 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 13.
90. Id.
91. Colangelo, supra note 76, at 143; Council Directive 2000/31, arts. 14(3), 15,
2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 13.
92. Council Directive 2001/29, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10.
93. Id. para. 59. Recitals are “whereas” clauses at the beginning of legislation
that the drafters include to aid in interpretation. Tadas Klimas & Jurate Vaiciukaite, The Law of Recitals in European Community Legislation, 15 ILSA J. Int’l
& Comp. L. 1, 7 (2008). Scholars and politicians frequently disagree about the
legal effect that should be afforded Recitals. Id. at 7, 11. Courts also place varying
levels of value on Recitals as interpretive tools, ranging from entirely irrelevant to
mandatory law valued above other legislative provisions. Id. at 12–13. However,
at minimum, Recitals set forth the reasons underlying the legislation that they accompany and help to explain the drafters’ choices about which medium of legislation was best suited for their aims. Id. at 7, 9.
94. Council Directive 2001/29, para. 59.
95. See Council Directive 2001/29, paras. 25, 31, 35, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10,
12–13 (defining a rightholder as the owner of rights in a piece of intellectual property who possesses an exclusive right to make their copyrighted works available to
the public.) The Directive also describes different categories of rightholders and
protected subject-matter, much of which rightholders can license for use. Id.
96. See id. (indicating broadly that an intermediary carries a third party’s infringement of a protected work when the infringing third party uses the intermediary’s services to engage in infringing activities).
97. Id. para. 59.
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protection.98 However, Article 8 also requires that sanctions under
its authority shall be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive.99
3. The 2004 Enforcement Directive
The EU passed the 2004 Enforcement Directive (“Enforcement Directive”)100 with the goal of effectively applying substantive
intellectual property law in the EU.101 Discussions about the Enforcement Directive arose out of concern that member states were
enforcing intellectual property rights in disparate ways, despite being subject to the same EU-wide intellectual property
conventions.102
The Enforcement Directive sets forth an affirmative right for
rightholders to apply for injunctions against intermediaries whose
services and/or websites permit or facilitate infringing uses.103 The
Directive emphasizes the importance of provisional measures allowing for immediate termination of infringement, even before a
court decides on the merits of an infringement action.104 The Enforcement Directive even references “prohibitory measures” when
“justified by the circumstances” to prevent future intellectual property right infringements.105
The Enforcement Directive appears to give significant power
to rightholders to prevent infringement of their works, but the
scope of the Directive is limited.106 Article 2(3) of the Enforcement
Directive provides that the Directive shall not affect existing EU
provisions governing the substantive law on intellectual property in
general or the eCommerce Directive Articles 12 to 15 in particular.107 The Enforcement Directive also purports not to affect the
InfoSoc Directive108 and defers to the InfoSoc Directive to govern
injunctions against intermediaries.109 Thus, the Article 15 safe harbor provision—and the InfoSoc Directive’s effective, proportion98. Id. art. 8(3).
99. Id. art. 8.
100. Council Directive 2004/48, 2004 O.J. (L 167) 16.
101. Id. para. 3.
102. Id. para. 7.
103. Id. para. 23.
104. Id. para. 22.
105. Id. para. 24.
106. Id. art. 2(3).
107. Id. art. 2(3). Enforcement Directive article 2(3) also explains that the
Directive does not affect other EU directives regarding data protection and electronic signatures. See id.
108. Id. art. 2(2).
109. Council Directive 2004/48, 9(3)(a), 2004 O.J. (L 167) 16, 22.
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ate, and dissuasive requirement on sanctions—both remain
intact.110
While the Enforcement Directive does explicitly permit imposing pre-judicial provisional measures on defendants who have allegedly infringed on copyrights,111 the Enforcement Directive also
mandates a review, upon request of the defendant, to decide
whether the imposed preemptive measures were appropriate.112
The Enforcement Directive further requires the member states to
revoke the provisional measures, if the defendant so requests, when
the rightholder does not institute actual infringement proceedings
to protect his or her rights.113
Judicial authorities may also require an applicant to provide
compensation for injury caused by a member state judicial authority instituting unfounded provisional measures.114 Article 3(1) of
the Directive provides that measures, remedies, and procedures to
ensure enforcement of intellectual property rights shall be fair and
equitable, shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, and
shall not entail unreasonable time limits or unwarranted delays.115
The Enforcement Directive reiterates that measures must also be
effective, proportionate, and dissuasive,116 as required by the InfoSoc Directive.117 So, while the Enforcement Directive appears to
give rightholders substantial power to protect against the infringement of their works, it also provides several checks to ensure
rightholders do not abuse that power and to protect the safe harbor
provision for intermediaries.
D.

History of CJEU Case Law

Because the 2019 Copyright Directive involves fundamental
rights, the Charter provides that courts and member states must in110. See id. art. 8.
111. Id. art. 9(1)(a). Such pre-judicial measures occur before a defendant has
a chance to appear in court to defend himself or otherwise comment upon the
matter. Id. art. 9(4). These measures may include, for example, injunctions against
the allegedly infringing action, penalty payments, or guarantees by the alleged infringer that he or she will compensate the rightholder for the infringement. Id. art.
9(1)(a). The Directive permits member states to impose injunctions of this type
more liberally when there is a risk of irreparable harm to the rightholder if the
infringing action does not cease. Id. art. 9(4).
112. Id. art. 9(4).
113. Id. art. 9(5).
114. Id. art. 9(7).
115. Id. art. 3(1).
116. Council Directive 2004/48, 3(2), 2004 O.J. (L 167) 16, 20.
117. Council Directive 2001/29, art. 8, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 18.
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terpret the Directive in the light of CJEU case law.118 The CJEU
has extensive case law regarding the rights of copyright holders and
OSPs on the Internet, principally in two areas: 1) primary and secondary liability for intermediaries119 and 2) the allowance of proactive monitoring obligations, which lead to de facto strict liability.120
1. Defining a “Communication to the Public” and Primary
Versus Secondary Liability
The Council passed Recital 64 alongside the 2019 Copyright
Directive.121 Recital 64 explains that “online content-sharing service providers perform an act of communication to the public” and
therefore are responsible for their content.122 However, this pronouncement conflicts with the approach the CJEU has taken to interpret the meaning of “communication to the public” in prior case
law.123 The CJEU has not historically found that a communication
to the public occurs each time a provider does more than provide
physical facilities.124 Rather, the CJEU previously held that a
“communication to the public” requires a user giving access to the
protected content to an additional group of people: a “new” public
who would not have been able to enjoy the work absent that indis118. Explanations, supra note 60, at 33. See also Aida Torres Pérez, The Federalizing Force of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 1080 INT’L J. CONT. L. 15
(2017) (explaining that the Charter acts as a floor when EU legislation calls for
member state implementation: member state authorities and courts may implement EU law as they choose, but implementation measures must protect the fundamental rights enumerated in the Charter with the level of protection called for
by the Charter and the interpretive CJEU case law).
119. Giancarlo Frosio, To Filter or Not to Filter? That is the Question in EU
Copyright Reform, 36 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 331, 340 (2018) [hereinafter
Frosio, To Filter].
120. Id. at 352.
121. Council Directive 2019/790, para. 64, 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92, 106. In earlier
versions of the Directive, this provision was numbered Recital 38. See Proposal
for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the
Digital Single Market, at 20, COM (2016) 593 final (Sept. 14, 2016). The Proposal
read:
Where information society service providers store and provide access to
the public to copyright protected works or other subject-matter uploaded
by their users, thereby going beyond the mere provision of physical facilities and performing an act of communication to the public, they are
obliged to conclude licensing agreements with rightholders.
Id. The earlier version, however, explicitly excluded OSPs who were hosting providers pursuant to the definition in Council Directive 2000/31, art. 14, 2000 O.J. (L
178) 1, 13. See id. Some of the Directive’s opponents aimed their complaints at
this provision, under the name Recital 38. See, e.g., Mezei & Harkai, supra note
74, at 25; Stalla-Bourdillon, supra note 42, at 13.
122. Council Directive 2019/790, para. 64, 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92, 106.
123. Frosio, To Filter, supra note 119, at 342.
124. Id.
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pensable intervention.125 Because end-users126 upload work, the
CJEU determined that their “indispensable intervention,” not any
of the hosting provider’s actions, amounted to infringement.127 The
pre-2019 system thus distinguished end-users from online hosting
providers, regardless of their level of involvement, so long the providers did not deliberately choose to pass along infringing material.128 Additionally, the question of whether a communication to
the public had occurred would be for the courts to decide on a caseby-case basis.129 The judgments of the CJEU indicate that a service
provider’s 1) key intervention and 2) knowledge are the important
considerations in determining whether a deliberate passing-along of
information—and therefore a communication to the public—has
occurred.130 Under the pre-2019 regime, a judicial body would undertake this analysis for every act of alleged infringement attributed
to a service provider, rather than automatically assuming that a
communication to the public has occurred merely because the infringing content appears on an OSP’s site.131 Recital 64 instead allows a judicial body to assume a communication to the public has
occurred in any infringement case involving content posted to an
online content sharing provider’s website.132
The “communication to the public” determination is vital because OSPs that communicate to the public are directly—rather
125. Joined Cases C-403 & 429/08, Football Ass’n Premier League v. QC Leisure, 2011 E.C.R. I-9159, 9238-89, paras. 194-97; id. at 343.
126. See Giancarlo F. Frosio, Reforming Intermediary Liability in the Platform
Economy: A European Digital Single Market Strategy, 112 NW. U.L. REV. ONLINE
19, 36 (2017) [hereinafter Frosio, Reforming Intermediary Liability] (explaining
that end-users are users of online platforms who physically upload and download
content).
127. Joined Cases C-403 & 429/08, Football Ass’n Premier League v. QC Leisure, 2011 E.C.R. I-9159, 9238, para. 195.
128. Frosio, To Filter, supra note 119, at 344; Council Directive 2000/31, art.
14, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 13.
129. See e.g. Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV,
ECLI:EU:C:2017:456, para. 18 (Curia), https://bit.ly/33MFsDF (addressing
whether “communication to the public” includes creation of peer-to-peer sharing
platform); Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v. Sanoma Media Neth. BV,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:644, para. 20 (Curia), https://bit.ly/3fJLE1s (addressing whether
the posting of a hyperlink to a work constituted a “communication to the public”).
See also Frosio, Reforming Intermediary Liability, supra note 126, at 36 (“characterizing hosting providers as ‘communicating to the public’ has never been an obvious conclusion under EU law.”).
130. Stalla-Bourdillon, supra note 42, at 16 (2017), citing Case C-160/15 GS
Media BV v. Sanoma Media Neth. BV, ECLI:EU:C2016:644, para. 349 (Curia),
https://bit.ly/3fJLE1s.
131. Stalla-Bourdillon, supra note 42, at 16.
132. See Council Directive 2019/790, para. 64, 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92, 106.
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than secondarily—liable for infringement.133 The assumption that
OSPs are communicating with the public and are therefore directly
liable is a significant departure from the liability standard for OSPs
under the old framework.134
The CJEU has reiterated its position assigning mere secondary
liability to OSPs, absent a finding of a communication to the public.135 Under the CJEU decision in GS Media v. Sanoma Media,136
a hosting provider is not primarily liable unless it communicates to
the public by providing access to infringing material to a “new public.”137 In GS Media, the hosting site posted hyperlinks to copyright-protected content at other locations on the Internet where the
content was already freely accessible.138 The CJEU found that the
alleged infringement had not reached a “new public” when the content was already available elsewhere on the Internet because users
could have accessed the content without the OSP’s intervention.139
However, the court still considered the knowledge element to determine whether a communication to the public had occurred.140
Ultimately, GS Media communicated to the public because the
company had knowledge of the illegal nature of the links.141 The
CJEU said that if the secondary poster either 1) should have known
that the original posting of the content was infringement, or 2)
posted the links in pursuit of financial gain, then a court could presume the poster had knowledge.142 Thus, in these two scenarios, a
court could determine that a communication to the public occurred,
despite no evidence of a “new public.”143 However, the court noted
that when posting on the second website merely enables a user to
more easily locate content that is legitimately posted elsewhere, the
website does not engage in a communication to the public.144 Thus,
the court maintained that a communication to the public was necessary in order to find an OSP directly—rather than secondarily—
liable, and that such a communication to the public only occurred
133. Stalla-Bourdillon, supra note 42, at 17; see Frosio, To Filter, supra note
119, at 343.
134. Stalla-Bourdillon, supra note 42, at 16, 18.
135. See e.g., Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v. Sanoma Media Neth. BV,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:644 (Curia), https://bit.ly/3fJLE1s.
136. Id.
137. Id. para. 21.
138. Id. para. 25.
139. Id. para. 42, 52.
140. Id. para. 55.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. para. 26, 55.
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when there was a) knowledge or b) a new public reached because of
the OSP’s intervention.145
A year later, the CJEU loosened the definition of “communication to the public” in Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV,146 finding that a
communication to the public occurs when a person or OSP makes
available or manages a sharing platform which, via the “indexation
of metadata referring to protected works and the provision of a
search engine, allows users of that platform to locate those works
and to share them in the context of a peer-to-peer network.”147
Prior to Ziggo, the CJEU required an “indispensable” standard to
find that a “communication to the public” had occurred,148 meaning
that, unless the infringement could never have occurred without the
conduct in question, the actor was not liable for a copyright
violation.149
In Ziggo, the CJEU instead employed an “essential” standard,150 meaning that an intervener could be liable when end-users
might have been able to find or share the infringing material without the online hosting provider’s intervention, but finding the infringing material would have been more complex.151 The court
found that an intervention rising to the level of a communication
had occurred, even though the intervening party was not “indispensable” in the process of the end-user obtaining access but rather
“essential” to that access.152 The CJEU determined that, “as a rule,
any act by which a user, with full knowledge of the relevant facts,
provides its clients with [less complex] access to protected works is
liable to constitute an ‘act of communication’ ” under Article 3(1) of
the InfoSoc Directive.153
The court found that the defendant, The Pirate Bay, had violated the InfoSoc Directive because The Pirate Bay intervened,
with full knowledge, and because, without the defendant’s intervention, end-users would either not have been able to access the works,
or the sharing of the works would be more complex.154 The court
145. Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v. Sanoma Media Neth. BV,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:644, para. 55 (Curia), https://bit.ly/3fJLE1s.
146. Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV, ECLI:EU:C:2017:456 (Curia), https://bit.ly/33MFsDF.
147. Id. paras. 37, 43, 48.
148. Frosio, To Filter, supra note 119, at 344.
149. Id.
150. Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV, ECLI:EU:C:2017:456, para.
37, 43 (Curia), https://bit.ly/33MFsDF.
151. Id. para. 36.
152. Id. para. 37.
153. Id. para. 35.
154. Id. para. 36

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\125-1\DIK104.txt

180

unknown

Seq: 20

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

28-SEP-20

14:23

[Vol. 125:161

also found it important that The Pirate Bay actively filtered some
content and deleted obsolete files.155 Even under this loosened
standard, the court was unwilling to find that a communication to
the public had occurred without a) knowledge or b) the infringing
content reaching a new public.156 The only change in the liability
scheme was that the court was willing to find the OSP liable on the
basis that the content had reached a new public when the OSP was
essential to that process rather than indispensable.157
Under the decisions in GS Media and Ziggo, the court considers several factors in determining whether a website commits a
communication to the public, including intent, financial gain, and
the extent to which the website reaches a “new public” with its
communication.158 Unless the rightholder can establish some or all
of these factors, a new public is not reached and the OSP is not
directly liable for copyright infringement.159 Additionally, under
both cases, the question of whether an OSP communicated to the
public—and thereby incurred primary liability—remains a case-bycase decision for the courts based on those factors.160
2. Proactive Monitoring Obligations and De Facto Strict Liability
A second concern with the 2019 Copyright Directive in the
context of CJEU case law is its placement of monitoring obligations
on intermediaries.161 Article 15 of the eCommerce Directive explicitly prohibits general monitoring obligations but allows national
law to provide for such monitoring obligations in specific cases.162
155. Id. para. 38.
156. Id. para. 35
157. Frosio, To Filter, supra note 119, at 344.
158. Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV, ECLI:EU:C:2017:456, para.
28 (Curia), https://bit.ly/33MFsDF; Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v. Sanoma Media
Neth. BV, ECLI:EU:C:2016:644, paras. 53, 22 (Curia), https://bit.ly/3fJLE1s.
159. See Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV, ECLI:EU:C:2017:456,
para. 28 (Curia), https://bit.ly/33MFsDF; Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v. Sanoma
Media Neth. BV, ECLI:EU:C:2016:644, paras. 42, 52 (Curia), https://bit.ly/
3fJLE1s.
160. See generally Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV,
ECLI:EU:C:2017:456 (Curia), https://bit.ly/33MFsDF (court undertook an analysis
to determine if OSP communicated to the public); Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v.
Sanoma Media Neth. BV, ECLI:EU:C:2016:644 (Curia), https://bit.ly/3fJLE1s
(same).
161. Frosio, To Filter, supra note 119, at 352. Intermediaries can be Internet
access providers such as Comcast and Verizon or hosting providers such as
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Microsoft. See Frosio, Reforming Intermediary
Liability, supra note 126, at 20, 25. “Online platforms” are considered a subset of
online intermediaries. Id. at 22.
162. Council Directive 2000/31, art. 15, 2000 O.J. (178) 1, 13.
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In the past, the CJEU has chosen to balance the competing
interests of intellectual property rights and freedom to impart and
receive information by interpreting the eCommerce Directive to establish a liability framework based on actual or constructive knowledge.163 Under this system, hosting providers are not liable unless
they have actual knowledge of the infringing content and refuse to
remove the infringing content once they have that knowledge.164
Additionally, proactive monitoring requirements are not only disallowed under this system but are also unnecessary because an OSP is
not liable until the OSP knows of the infringement.165
a.

Anti-Monitoring Case Law

In Scarlet v. SABAM,166 the CJEU considered a case in which
the Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL
(SABAM) brought suit against Scarlet Extended SA in response to
Scarlet’s refusal to install a system for filtering electronic communications that use file-sharing software.167 SABAM is a management
company representing authors, composers, and editors in authorizing the use of their musical works.168 Scarlet is an OSP that delivers
its customers access to the Internet.169 SABAM brought suit because customers on Scarlet’s service were using peer-to-peer, filesharing applications to download music belonging to SABAM without paying royalties.170 SABAM sought, among other remedies, an
order requiring Scarlet to end the infringement by blocking its customers from sending and receiving files containing musical works
via peer-to-peer software without the permission of rightholders.171
SABAM also sought a periodic penalty for Scarlet’s noncompliance.172 Scarlet challenged the requested injunction on several
163. Frosio, To Filter, supra note 119, at 352. See also Pérez, supra note 118
(explaining that the CJEU has been increasingly protective of Charter-enumerated
rights ever since it entered into force in 2009).
164. Frosio, To Filter, supra note 119, at 352.
165. Id.
166. Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL, 2011 E.C.R. I-12006.
167. Id. para. 2. This case originated in the Tribunal de premiere instance in
Brussels. Id. para 18. SABAM prevailed in that court and Scarlet appealed to the
cour d’appel de Bruxelles. Id. para 24, 28. That court referred the case to the
CJEU to determine, in a preliminary ruling, the relation between several EU Directives governing copyright in the digital context, and the effects of those Directives on national courts. Id. para 28.
168. Id. para. 15.
169. Id. para. 16.
170. Id. para. 17.
171. Id. para. 20.
172. Id.
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grounds, including that the injunction would violate Article 15 of
the eCommerce Directive because the injunction would impose a
general obligation for Scarlet to monitor communications on its
network.173
In deciding Scarlet, the CJEU thus considered whether the
eCommerce Directive and the InfoSoc Directive, read together and
in conjunction with the protection of fundamental rights under the
Charter, prevent an injunction on an OSP to introduce a system for
filtering.174 The CJEU considered whether such a system for filtering, which identified and blocked infringing music files, was impermissibly broad when it 1) accessed all electronic communications
passing via the intermediary’s services, in particular those using
peer-to-peer software, 2) applied indiscriminately to all its customers, 3) was a preventative measure, 4) was provided at the exclusive
expense of the intermediary,175 and 5) lasted for an unlimited period.176 Under these circumstances, the court agreed with Scarlet,
finding that SABAM’s requested preventive filtering requirement
was too broad.177 The court found that Article 15 of the eCommerce Directive therefore prohibited SABAM’s injunction because
the requested filtering requirement essentially necessitated active
monitoring of all data for all customers, amounting to a general
monitoring obligation.178
While Article 17(2) of the Charter contains the obligation to
protect intellectual property rights, the CJEU found nothing in the
wording of the provision or case law to indicate that the right to
protection of intellectual property is inviolable, requiring absolute
protection.179 Rather, the court determined that national authorities and courts must strike a fair balance between the protection of
copyright and the protection of the fundamental rights of the affected websites’ users.180 Ultimately, the CJEU struck down
SABAM’s monitoring requirement injunction because the injunction infringed on several Charter-protected rights including the
OSP’s freedom to conduct its business and the OSP’s customers’
rights to protection of data and freedom to receive or impart infor173.
174.
175.
176.
positeurs
177.
178.
179.
positeurs
180.

Id. para. 25.
Id. para. 29.
Id. In this case the intermediary was Scarlet. See id. paras. 5, 25.
Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société belge des auteurs, comet éditeurs SCRL, 2011 E.C.R. I-12006, para. 29.
Id. paras. 36, 39–40.
Id.
Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société belge des auteurs, comet éditeurs SCRL, 2011 E.C.R. I-12006, 12025, para. 43.
Id. para. 45.
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mation.181 The court therefore clarified that a fair balance between
those conflicting rights required permitting some infringement of
copyright and disallowing the infringement of the right to freedom
of expression.182 In short, an active monitoring requirement like
the one requested in Scarlet is impermissible because it does not
provide enough protection for (among other rights) the Article 11
right to freedom of information and expression.183 Thus, in Scarlet,
the CJEU reinforced the prohibition on general, proactive monitoring requirements for access providers.184
The CJEU further acknowledged that the prohibition on active
monitoring requirements comes from the language in Article 11 of
the Charter, protecting the freedom to impart and receive information.185 The prohibition also finds support in Article 3(1) of the
Enforcement Directive, which requires measures that protect intellectual property rights to not be unnecessarily complicated or
costly.186 Because the expenses for implementing a filtering system
were borne only by the OSPs, the court found that the injunction
requiring filtering was unnecessarily costly and a violation of the
OSP’s freedom to conduct business.187
The court affirmed the Scarlet holding in SABAM v. Netlog188
when it disallowed an injunction ordering a social network to adopt
a content filtering system to prevent access to copyright-infringing
material.189 In this case, SABAM brought suit against Netlog, a site
on which users would build virtual communities and publish video
clips.190 SABAM complained that such videos often contained
copyrighted content for which rightholders, through SABAM, were
not receiving royalties.191 SABAM further alleged that Netlog was
181. Id. para. 48, 50.
182. See id. While the CJEU in Scarlet called the right “the freedom to receive or impart information,” the court also cited to Article 11 as a whole, encompassing the freedom of expression as well. See id. para. 50. See also supra note 50
and accompanying text (explaining that the court sometimes uses “freedom to receive or impart information” and “freedom of expression” interchangeably because both are enumerated in Article 11 of the Charter).
183. See Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société belge des auteurs,
compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL, 2011 E.C.R. I-12006, 12027, para. 50.
184. Frosio, To Filter, supra note 119, at 349.
185. Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL, 2011 E.C.R. I-12006, 12027, para. 50.
186. Id. para. 48.
187. Id. para. 49.
188. Case C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en
Uitgevers CVBA v. Netlog, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85 (Curia), https://bit.ly/2rnyB2S.
189. Id. para. 52.
190. Id. para. 17.
191. Id. para. 18.
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allowing such copyrighted content to be illegally shared with the
public.192
As in Scarlet, the court made its determination on the basis of
Article 15 of the eCommerce Directive, reiterating that Article 15
prevented member states from imposing a general monitoring obligation on OSPs.193 The court found that the requested injunction,
which would require Netlog to introduce a system of filtration in an
attempt to identify electronic files containing SABAM’s music, was
impermissible.194 The court emphasized that the requested injunction constituted a general monitoring obligation because the proposed system would be used as a preventative measure for all of
Netlog’s customers, at Netlog’s own cost, for an unlimited period,
and would access most of the information on Netlog’s servers.195
The court reiterated that general monitoring obligations are incompatible with Article 3 of the Enforcement Directive, which requires that measures to protect intellectual property rights be fair
and proportionate and not excessively costly.196
Finally, the court explained that filtering measures and proactive monitoring obligations must strike a fair balance between copyright and other fundamental rights, including users’ freedom to
impart and receive information.197 The court expressed concerns
that such measures “could potentially undermine freedom of information, since that system might not distinguish adequately between
unlawful content and lawful content, with the result that its introduction could lead to the blocking of lawful communications.”198
The court reasoned that a general monitoring obligation, such as
the obligation in SABAM’s proposal, does not strike the right balance.199 Thus, the court clarified that copyright law is not a right to
be valued above others but rather one of many important rights
that EU law must guarantee in accordance with the Charter.200
The court repeatedly referenced its decision in Scarlet throughout the Netlog decision.201 The court defined “hosting” in accor192. Id.
193. Id. para. 3.
194. Id. paras. 22, 26, 52.
195. Id.
196. Id. para. 34.
197. Id. para. 51.
198. Case C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en
Uitgevers CVBA v. Netlog NV, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85, para. 50 (Curia), https://
bit.ly/2rnyB2S.
199. Id. para. 51.
200. Mezei & Harkai, supra note 74.
201. Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL, 2011 E.C.R. I-12006, paras. 29–34, 38, 41, 49–51.
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dance with Article 14 of the eCommerce Directive202 and then
determined that Netlog, a social media site, is a hosting provider.203
The court thus extended its decision in Scarlet, finding it impermissible under the safe harbor provision in Article 15 of the eCommerce Directive to subject hosting providers (in addition to OSPs)
to a general monitoring obligation.204
In both the Scarlet and Netlog decisions, the court invalidated
general monitoring obligations on three separate grounds: 1) the
requirement that protections of fundamental rights strike a fair balance when such protections infringe on other fundamental rights
and a determination that broad general monitoring requirements
fail this test, 2) the eCommerce Article 15 prohibition on proactive
monitoring requirements, and 3) the requirement in Article 3 of the
Enforcement Directive that monitoring requirements must be fair,
proportionate, and not excessively costly.205
b.

Pro-Monitoring Case Law

Despite the clear prohibition on general monitoring requirements that the CJEU articulated in Scarlet and Netlog, the court has
decided several cases in recent years that indicate the court’s willingness to permit general monitoring.206 In Telekabel v. Constantine Film,207 the court emphasized that such an injunction requiring
a monitoring obligation would protect copyright, which is also a
fundamental right deserving maximum protection.208 The court reiterated the fair balance analysis but found that the established filtering system, if sufficiently narrowly tailored, might not violate
freedom of information.209 However, in order to be allowed, such
measures would have to be sufficiently effective to ensure genuine
protection of copyright and to prevent unauthorized access to the
protected subject matter.210 Absent sufficient effectiveness, the
measures would fail to strike the right balance.211 The CJEU thus
allowed an injunction requiring an OSP to develop preventative
202. Id. para. 4.
203. Id. para. 27.
204. Id.
205. See id. paras. 35–36, 45; Case C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging van
Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers v. Netlog, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85, paras. 33–34,
51 (Curia), https://bit.ly/2rnyB2S.
206. Nadal, supra note 70, at 29–30.
207. Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel v. Constantin Film, ECLI:EU:C:2014:192,
(Curia), https://bit.ly/30EUOIv.
208. Id. para. 31.
209. Id. para. 56.
210. Id. para. 62.
211. Id.
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measures when the injunction did not prescribe the exact measures
the OSP must take, so long as the OSP could and did adopt measures which struck a balance between applicable fundamental
rights.212
In Bonnier Audio v. Perfect Commc’n,213 the court upheld a
similar standard.214 The court found that legislation succeeded at
striking a fair balance between various rights when it required 1)
clear evidence of actual infringement of intellectual property rights
before other rights could be compromised, 2) that the information
requested was necessary to facilitate the investigation into the infringement, and 3) that the reasons for the measure outweighed the
nuisance or other harm entailed for the person or conflicting interests affected,215 namely an Internet subscriber/user or another legally protected right or interest.216 The legislation at issue in
Bonnier required that OSPs not just monitor for intellectual property infringements but also transmit personal data about the infringers to authorities investigating the infringements.217 Despite
the multiple fundamental rights at issue, the CJEU found that the
legislation struck a fair balance.218
While the CJEU has not officially changed course on the permissibility of general proactive monitoring requirements for OSPs,
the decisions in Telekabel and Bonnier show the court’s willingness
to find that a proactive monitoring requirement strikes a fair balance between the competing fundamental rights of intellectual
property and freedom of information in certain circumstances.219
III.

ANALYSIS

The original version of the 2019 Copyright Directive explicitly
called for proactive monitoring obligations by intermediaries.220 In
addition to the poor public reception to the proposed Directive,
many critics believed that the Directive’s proactive monitoring requirement violated Article 15 of the eCommerce Directive and its
212. Id. para. 63–64.
213. Case C-461/10, Bonnier Audio v. Perfect Commc’n Swed. AB,
ECLI:EU:C:2012:219 (Curia), https://bit.ly/3krVatV.
214. Id. para. 56–58.
215. Id.
216. Id. para. 51. See also id. paras. 59–60 (identifying the protection of personal data as the conflicting interest at issue in Bonnier).
217. Id. para. 52.
218. Id. para. 56.
219. See Stalla-Bourdillon, supra note 42, at 14; Nadal, supra note 70, at 31.
220. See Thomas Riis & Sebastian Felix Schwemer, Leaving the European
Safe Harbor, Sailing Toward Algorithmic Content Regulation, 22 No. 7 J. INTERNET L. 1, 2 (2019).
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CJEU case law interpretation, which prohibited monitoring obligations.221 The final version of the 2019 Directive, as passed, removes
this strict obligation to proactively monitor.222
However, the 2019 Copyright Directive still massively changes
the liability scheme for OSPs in two major ways.223 First, the Directive gives OSPs primary liability instead of secondary liability by
proclaiming that OSPs “communicate to the public” in a wide range
of situations in which OSPs were previously found to be passive
parties to the infringement.224 Because OSPs can now be held primarily liable, the 2019 Copyright Directive may also impose strict
liability on OSPs.225 Under the Directive, OSPs are responsible
from the moment anyone uploads content, regardless of whether
the OSP had knowledge of the infringing content’s existence.226
The new version of the Copyright Directive thus retains the presumption of knowledge from the first draft.227
A. Poland’s Challenge to the 2019 Copyright Directive in the
CJEU
Poland asserts that the new presumption of knowledge creates
a scheme of liability in which proactive monitoring is necessary for
OSPs to avoid liability for infringement.228 Because OSPs are directly and strictly liable for infringing content from the moment the
content is uploaded, OSPs have little choice but to proactively monitor, despite legislation and case law precedent protecting OSPs and
consumers from the imposition of proactive monitoring requirements.229 The Directive thus imposes a novel, immense burden on
OSPs to ensure that no infringing content reaches the public via
their platforms—and leaves it up to those OSPs to determine what
constitutes infringement.230 OSPs will be encouraged to over-block
material to avoid expensive litigation, inevitably leading to the sup221. Frosio, To Filter, supra note 119, at 349.
222. See Council Directive 2019/790, art. 17(8), 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92, 120.
223. Nadal, supra note 70, at 25.
224. Id.; Council Directive 2019/790, art. 17(1) 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92, 119.
225. Frosio, To Filter, supra note 119, at 352.
226. Id.
227. See id.
228. Action Brought on May 24, 2019, Case C-401/19, Pol. v. Parliament, 2019
O.J. (C 270) 21, 22.
229. Id. (asserting that the Directive necessitates “prior automatic verification
(filtering)” of user content and the introduction of “preventive control mechanisms” for an OSP to avoid liability).
230. See id. See also Doctorow, The European Copyright Directive, supra
note 1.
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pression of free expression.231 As a result, Poland asserts that the
Directive is invalid because it infringes on the right to freedom of
expression, along with other fundamental rights, rendering it incompatible with the Charter.232
In considering the challenge Poland raised, the CJEU must determine whether the Directive strikes the right balance between
competing fundamental rights under the Charter.233 Additionally,
the CJEU has traditionally evaluated whether Directives comport
with the eCommerce Directive’s Article 15 prohibition of proactive
monitoring requirements. The court typically also considers the requirement in Article 3 of the Enforcement Directive that monitoring requirements be fair, proportionate, and not excessively costly
when evaluating whether proactive monitoring requirements should
be upheld.234 The CJEU will likely consider these tests when evaluating whether the new Directive complies with the Charter.235
B. Test 1 – Proportionality
The right to protection of intellectual property is not inviolable.236 The Charter does not require absolute protection of intellectual property at the expense of other fundamental rights.237
Instead, the Charter requires that courts and authorities strike a fair
balance between the protection of copyright and the fundamental
rights of the affected websites’ users.238 The 2019 Copyright Directive constitutes a limitation on the fundamental right of freedom to
impart and receive information, in favor of the right to protection
231. See Doctorow, The European Copyright Directive, supra note 1 (explaining that the Directive provides damages for infringement of copyright, but not for
the improper censoring of legitimate posts). Because this imbalance financially penalizes OSPs if they fail to catch infringing content, they have an incentive to overfilter. See id.
232. Action Brought on May 24, 2019, Case C-401/19, Pol. v. Parliament, 2019
O.J. (C 270) 21, 22; see Riis, supra note 220 (explaining that all provisions on
proactive filtering obligations are subject to the analysis in Scarlet and Netlog, including the proposed Article 13—now Article 17—obligation).
233. See Nadal, supra note 70, at 28. See also Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended
SA v. Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL, 2011 E.C.R. I12006, paras. 36, 45.
234. See Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société belge des auteurs,
compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL, 2011 E.C.R. I-12006, paras. 35–36, 45; Case C-360/
10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA v. Netlog
NV, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85, paras. 33–34, 51(Curia), https://bit.ly/2rnyB2S.
235. See Nadal, supra note 70, at 29.
236. Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL, 2011 E.C.R. I-12006, para. 43.
237. Id.
238. Id. para. 45.
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of intellectual property.239 Imposing immediate liability on OSPs
for any infringing information passing through their servers essentially requires OSPs that wish to avoid liability to proactively monitor all data that contacts their services.240
This monitoring of user data constitutes a restriction on users’
rights to receive and impart information because filtering systems
cannot always distinguish between copyright-infringing content and
lawful content.241 Thus, lawfully communicated information is always at risk of being blocked by the filters.242 The imposition of
liability for all infringing content also encourages OSPs to over-filter, rather than under-filter, increasing the risk of infringement
upon the fundamental right to information.243
The Explanations accompanying the Charter only permit limitations on fundamental rights when the restrictions “correspond to
objectives of general interest pursued by the Community.”244 The
2019 Directive likely meets this standard because it responds to
concerns about a “value gap” between the number of people accessing copyright-protected content and the royalties that rightholders
are receiving from that access.245 The European Commission also
doubted the effectiveness of the pre-2019 notice and takedown regime,246 which provides an additional objective of general interest
to justify the limitation.247
The principle of proportionality also requires limitations on
fundamental rights to be necessary.248 The 2019 Directive must be
necessary because it imposes a limitation on the fundamental right
to freedom of expression and information.249 The Directive’s ar239. Nadal, supra note 70, at 26; see Action Brought on May 24, 2019, Case C401/19, Pol. v. Parliament, 2019 O.J. (C 270) 21, 22.
240. Nadal, supra note 70, at 30.
241. Id. at 29.
242. Id.
243. Riis, supra note 220, at 11.
244. Explanations, supra note 60, at 32.
245. See Colangelo, supra note 76, at 142 (explaining that the ease of access to
copyright-protected content via online content providers makes it difficult for
rightholders to determine when their works are being used and affects
rightholders’ ability to get payment for that use).
246. See Riis, supra note 220 at 17 (explaining that the regime set up by the
eCommerce Directive creates a notice-and-takedown system by which rightholders
or other users alert the OSP to the existence of infringing content, giving the OSP
“actual knowledge” sufficient to hold them liable, which ensures the OSP’s “expeditious removal” of the allegedly infringing content).
247. See id. at 148.
248. Charter, supra note 41, art. 52.
249. See id.; Action Brought on May 24, 2019, Case C-401/19, Pol. v. Parliament, 2019 O.J. (C 270) 21–22.
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ticulated bases of necessity are questionable.250 Legal scholars have
criticized the necessity of the 2019 Directive because its “value gap”
claims—most frequently propagated by the music industry251—are
not sufficiently supported by empirical evidence.252 However, studies actually indicate that artist profits have increased as a result of
online music streaming platforms.253 Furthermore, the assessment
of the purported impact of the Directive admitted that its creators
had not conducted an elaborate quantitative comparison of the effectiveness of the Directive and other potential policy options.254
Even if the “value gap” exists, the Directive is not “necessary” if it
will not solve the problem.255 Because industry claims about the
value gap are unsupported, and because the Directive might not
even fix such a gap if it did exist, the purported value gap does not
satisfy the “necessity” requirement to allow for limitations on the
right of freedom of expression.256
In addition to necessity, the principle of proportionality also
requires limitations on fundamental rights to not constitute “disproportionate and unreasonable interference” that undermines the
very substance of the fundamental right being restricted.257 This
means that the limitations on a fundamental right cannot be so restricting that the right is effectively no longer protected at all.258 In
terms of the current Directive, the principle of proportionality requires that the essence of the right to receive and impart information still be upheld.259
In determining whether a regulation or piece of legislation
strikes a proportional balance between conflicting fundamental
rights, the CJEU generally holds that proactive monitoring obligations do not strike the right balance when the obligations consist of
a system that filters by identifying and blocking infringing files.260
Such a system is too broad and thereby constitutes a general monitoring obligation when it 1) accesses all electronic communications
passing through the intermediary’s services, 2) applies indiscriminately to all of the service’s customers, 3) is a preventative measure,
250. See Colangelo, supra note 76, at 154.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. Explanations, supra note 60, at 32.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société belge des auteurs,
compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL, 2011 E.C.R. I-12006, para. 29.
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4) is provided exclusively at the expense of the intermediary, and 5)
lasts for an unlimited period.261 The court in Netlog affirmed the
prohibition in a similar scenario, finding that a filtration system
failed to strike the right balance based on the same criteria.262
However, in Netlog, the court only mentioned that the system accessed “most” of the information on the OSP’s servers, not all.263
While this change is slight, it represents the CJEU’s position that
the right of Europeans to freely receive and impart information
must be protected even against less clearly intrusive filtration.264
By imposing liability for any infringing content posted on an
OSP’s site or transmitted through an OSP’s servers, the 2019 Directive requires the monitoring system to access all the data passing
through the OSP’s servers and apply to all the OSP’s customers.265
Additionally, by imposing immediate liability from the moment of
upload, before actual harm is done, the Directive requires the monitoring system to be proactive and preventative.266 The Directive
also offers no indication of resources dedicated to the implementation of these systems, indicating that OSPs will bear the costs of
whatever monitoring system the OSPs choose to implement.267 Finally, the Directive does not indicate an end date for strict liability
for OSPs.268 That means that OSPs must adopt any imposed monitoring systems used to avoid liability for an unlimited period of
time.269 The Directive therefore necessitates that OSPs adopt a
monitoring system meeting all five of the criteria deemed impermissible in Scarlet.270 Such an obligation constitutes a general, proactive monitoring requirement and therefore fails to strike a balance
between competing fundamental rights under CJEU case law.271
Finally, the Directive may also fail the proportionality analysis
even if the CJEU were to disagree with Poland’s assertion that the
261. Id. paras. 29, 36, 39–40.
262. Case C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en
Uitgevers CVBA v. Netlog NV, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85, para. 52 (Curia), https://
bit.ly/2rnyB2S.
263. Id. paras. 23, 25.
264. See id. para. 48 (emphasizing that the court is unwilling to permit the
monitoring system because it infringes on the right to protection of personal data
and the right to receive and impart information).
265. See Council Directive 2019/790, art 17(1) 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92, 119.
(OSPs have to obtain licenses before any copyrighted works may legally appear on
their sites).
266. See id.
267. See id. art. 17.
268. See id.
269. See id.
270. See supra notes 260–262 and accompanying text.
271. See Riis, supra note 220, at 9.
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Directive necessitates a general monitoring requirement.272 The
Directive triggers a proportionality analysis because of its potential
harms to the Charter-protected rights of two parties.273 First, the
European Commission encourages OSPs to self-regulate for infringing content.274 The Directive both explicitly articulates this as
a policy standpoint and impliedly requires it as a necessary consequence of liability-increasing legislation.275 OSPs are subject to
challenges under this scheme when they fail to successfully self-regulate.276 Second, this increase in liability on OSPs and the likely
resultant increase in self-regulation will also impact users’ freedom
of information because OSPs will be encouraged to over-monitor
their sites.277 Because of the risk of infringement on the rights of
both OSPs and users, the Directive will require a proportionality
analysis, even if it does not directly trigger an Article 15 analysis on
the basis of creating a general monitoring obligation.278 Since some
parties’ rights are gravely harmed, the CJEU might still find that
the Directive fails to strike a fair balance between competing fundamental rights, even if the court does not find that the Directive rises
to the level of a general monitoring obligation.279
C. Impact of Recent Pro-Monitoring Case Law on
Proportionality Analysis
In Telekabel, the CJEU found that an injunction requiring
monitoring systems struck a fair balance between conflicting fundamental rights when the injunction gave the OSP latitude to develop
and adopt its own preventative measures, so long as the measures
actually adopted by the OSP struck a fair balance.280 Proponents of
the 2019 Copyright Directive may argue that the decision in
Telekabel permits the imposition of a requirement that OSPs develop and implement monitoring procedures, so long as it allows
the OSPs latitude in doing so.281 Directive proponents may also
272. See id. at 12; see also Giancarlo F. Frosio, Why Keep a Dog and Bark
Yourself? From Intermediary Liability to Responsibility, 26 INT’L. J.L. & INFO.
TECH. 1, 1 (2018) [hereinafter Frosio, Why Keep a Dog].
273. See Charter, supra note 41 art. 52.
274. See Riis, supra note 220, at 10–11.
275. Id.
276. See id.
277. See id. at 11; see also Frosio, Why Keep a Dog, supra note 272, at 1.
278. See Riis, supra note 220, at 11; see also Frosio, Why Keep a Dog, supra
note 272, at 1.
279. See supra notes 265–271 and accompanying text.
280. Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien v. Constantin Film Varleih,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:192, para. 63–64 (Curia), https://bit.ly/30EUOIv.
281. See Nadal, supra note 70, at 30.
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claim that the requirement imposed by the 2019 Directive provides
such latitude because the Directive imposes no direct instructions
for the OSPs as to how OSPs must accomplish such monitoring.282
In fact, the final version of the Directive does not include an explicit monitoring requirement at all.283 However, as previously described, the monitoring obligation that the 2019 Copyright
Directive necessitates would require OSPs to adopt filtration systems that meet all five of the criteria deemed to impermissibly impose on the right to receive and impart information in Scarlet and
Netlog.284 Thus, while the Directive does not explicitly require that
OSPs adopt a monitoring system that fails to strike a balance, the
Directive leaves OSPs no choice but to implement a monitoring system that does not strike a balance.285 The legislation therefore does
not leave OSPs latitude to choose a permissible, balance-striking
system and is not consistent with the Charter’s proportionality requirements, even under the decision in Telekabel.
Proponents of the Directive may also argue that the decision in
Bonnier Audio provides a route for the Directive’s new OSP liability rules to be legitimized. In Bonnier, the CJEU found that legislation succeeded at striking a fair balance between various rights
when 1) the legislation required clear evidence of actual infringement of intellectual property rights before other rights could be
compromised, 2) the information requested was necessary to facilitate the investigation into the infringement,286 and 3) the legislation
required that the reasons for the measure outweighed the nuisance
or other harm the measure entailed for the person or conflicting
interest affected.287 Proponents of the 2019 Copyright Directive
may argue that the Directive amounts to a permissible monitoring
obligation on the basis that it strikes a fair balance between conflicting fundamental rights under the standard articulated in
Bonnier.288
However, if applied to the online copyright liability conflict,
the Bonnier standard would require the presentation of actual evi282. See id.
283. See id. at 26.
284. See supra notes 260–70 and accompanying text.
285. Nadal, supra note 70, at 26.
286. Case C-461/10, Bonnier Audio v. Perfect Commc’n Swed. AB,
ECLI:EU:C:2012:219, paras. 56–58 (Curia), https://bit.ly/3krVatV. Bonnier dealt
with data furnished to law enforcement in order to facilitate investigations into
intellectual property infringement. Id. para. 57. However, the court in Bonnier
analyzed the balance of implicated fundamental rights in the same manner the
court analyzes all conflicts of rights under the Charter. Id. para. 58.
287. Id. paras 56–58.
288. See Nadal, supra note 70, at 30.
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dence of infringement of intellectual property rights before the
right to receive and impart information could be infringed upon.289
Bonnier would allow for the implementation of a monitoring requirement that infringed upon the freedom to impart and receive
information only after an OSP had knowledge of infringement of
intellectual property rights.290 The Directive does not meet this
standard because it imposes liability from the moment content is
uploaded.291 Additionally, the legislation would strike a fair balance under Bonnier only if the reasons for the monitoring measure
outweighed the nuisance or other harms.292 The Bonnier standard
would therefore require a determination that the nuisance to users
and OSPs of monitoring all data passing through an OSP’s servers
did not outweigh the need to protect the intellectual property rights
of rightholders.293 In Bonnier, the court found the legislation permissible when the legislation required that a determination of this
type was made prior to the imposition on the conflicting fundamental right.294 The 2019 Directive requires no such determination
before imposing liability and, by extension, a monitoring requirement.295 The 2019 Directive’s monitoring requirement therefore
likely fails to strike a fair balance even under the standard imposed
in Bonnier.
D.

Test 2 – Article 15 Prohibition

In addition to questions of proportionality, underlying the decisions in Scarlet and Netlog is the Enforcement Directive’s Article
15 prohibition on general monitoring obligations.296 In both Scarlet
and Netlog, the court found that the proposed filtering systems constituted a general monitoring obligation and not only failed to strike
a fair balance but were also inconsistent with the prohibition on
general monitoring obligations.297 As previously analyzed, the mon289. See Case C-461/10, Bonnier Audio v. Perfect Commc’n Swed. AB,
ECLI:EU:C:2012:219, para. 56 (Curia), https://bit.ly/3krVatV.
290. See id. para. 56.
291. See Frosio, To Filter, supra note 119, at 352.
292. See Case C-461/10, Bonnier Audio v. Perfect Commc’n Swed. AB,
ECLI:EU:C:2012:219, para. 58 (Curia) https://bit.ly/3krVatV.
293. See id. para. 58.
294. Id. para. 56.
295. See Council Directive 2019/790, art. 17(1), 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92, 119.
296. Riis, supra note 220, at 9; Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société
belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL, 2011 E.C.R. I-12006, 12025,
para. 43; see also Case C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten
en Uitgevers CVBA v. Netlog NV, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85, para. 3 (Curia), https://
bit.ly/2rnyB2S.
297. Nadal, supra note 70, at 27. See Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v.
Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL, 2011 E.C.R. I-12006,
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itoring requirement effectively imposed by the 2019 Copyright Directive is similar to the impermissible Scarlet and Netlog filtering
requirements according to the five Scarlet criteria.298 Because of
this similarity, a system adopted to comply with the new provisions
would likely also necessarily constitute a general monitoring requirement and be deemed impermissible under the Enforcement
Directive’s Article 15 prohibition on general monitoring
requirements.
E.

Test 3 – Article 3 Requirement

Article 3(1) of the Enforcement Directive requires that any
measures to ensure enforcement of intellectual property rights shall
be fair and equitable, not be unnecessarily complicated or costly,
and not entail unreasonable time limits or unwarranted delays.299
The CJEU in Scarlet found that a general monitoring obligation
that met the five Scarlet criteria would fail the test in Article 3(1) of
the Enforcement Directive, which requires measures protecting intellectual property rights to not be unnecessarily complicated or
costly.300 In thus concluding, the CJEU emphasized the fact that
the injunction would have required the OSP to bear the costs of the
system on its own.301
As analyzed above, the general monitoring requirement that
the 2019 Directive impliedly imposes would necessarily meet the
same five criteria as the impermissible monitoring system in Scarlet,
including the criterion that the OSP would bear the costs of the
system.302 Thus, the monitoring requirement that the 2019 Directive imagines is also impermissible under the Enforcement Directive Article 3(1) requirement that measures for enforcing
intellectual property rights not be unnecessarily costly.303
The monitoring requirement that the 2019 Directive imagines
fails the three tests that the CJEU historically employs in determining whether monitoring obligations are permissible.304 If the CJEU
12025, para. 43; see also Case C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA v. Netlog NV, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85, paras. 22, 26, 52
(Curia), https://bit.ly/2rnyB2S.
298. See supra notes 260–70 and accompanying text.
299. Council Directive 2004/48, art. 3(1), 2004 O.J. (L 195) 16, 20.
300. Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL, 2011 E.C.R. I-12006, para. 49.
301. Id.
302. See supra notes 260–270 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 259–262 and accompanying text; Council Directive 2004/
48, art. 3(1), 2004 O.J. (L 167) 16, 20.
304. See supra Part III. A–D.
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chooses to analyze the Directive’s permissibility under these standards, as challenged in Poland’s complaint, CJEU case law directs
that the court will find the Directive impermissible.305
Recent decisions including Telekabel and Bonnier Audio indicate that the court has been willing to relax the prohibition on general monitoring obligations in certain scenarios.306 The CJEU may
be unwilling to find that 2019 Directive, as amended, truly mandates an impermissible general monitoring obligation.307 However,
even if the court concludes the Directive does not require a general
monitoring obligation, the court may also conclude that the Directive does not fail to strike a fair balance between conflicting fundamental rights or constitute an unnecessarily costly imposition on
OSPs and similarly refuse to invalidate it on those grounds.
The CJEU should find the 2019 Copyright Directive is inconsistent with CJEU case law and invalidate the Directive. If the Directive remains in effect, member states will have to implement the
Directive into national law by the end of 2021,308 which could
greatly suppress freedom of expression on the Internet
worldwide.309
IV.

CONCLUSION

The 2019 Copyright Directive and its controversial Article 17
threaten to stifle freedom of expression in Europe and around the
world in the name of closing a copyright “value gap” that arguably
does not exist.310 Poland has challenged the problematic provisions
of Article 17 in the Court of Justice of the European Union on several different bases.311
This Comment first set forth the complicated legislative framework within which the newest Directive must rest by recounting the
recent history of European attempts to regulate copyright law on
the Internet in a manner that comports with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which included three European Council Directives.312 This Comment next analyzed the CJEU’s case law
interpretation of those Directives, including cases addressing the
Directives’ interactions with one another and with the Charter, to
305. See supra Part III. A–D.
306. Nadal, supra note 70, at 29–30.
307. See id.
308. Davis, supra note 2.
309. See Doctorow, The European Copyright Directive, supra note 1.
310. Supra Part III.B
311. See Action Brought on May 24, 2019, Case C-401/19, Pol. v. Parliament,
2019 O.J. (C 270) 21–22; see also supra Part III.A.
312. Supra Part II.C.
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demonstrate the tough protections that the CJEU places around
fundamental rights, which the Directive’s supporters must overcome to see it implemented.313 Finally, this Comment analyzed the
probability that the CJEU will uphold the Directive’s Article 17
given the case-law-established tests that the CJEU will likely apply,
coupled with the court’s recent move toward heightened copyright
protection.314 Because of the strong protections provided by the
Charter of Fundamental Rights, coupled with the dangers the Directive poses to freedom of expression, this Comment concluded
that the court should invalidate the Article under the framework
established by prior case law, and advocated for the court to do so
to protect the future of European freedom of expression.315

313. Supra Part II.D.
314. Supra Part III.
315. Supra Part III.
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